Domestic political connections and international expansion: It's not only ‘who you know’ that matters

Former politicians on the board of directors bring to the firm domestic political connections and political knowledge. Previous research has mainly highlighted the role of contacts, without fully recognizing the role of political knowledge accumulated at home. By focusing on the effect of domestic political connections on foreign direct investment, we show that domestic political knowledge also shapes foreign expansion. We argue that contacts provided by former politicians may not be useful for foreign expansion whilst their political knowledge can be of help in countries with discretionary governments and with similar institutional environments to the one of the home country.     

Institutional context as a moderator of the relationship between board structure and acquirer returns

The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the supervisory role of the board of directors in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We focus our study on the European case, for which there is no previous exhaustive evidence on this topic. Using information on 985 mergers and acquisitions carried out over the period 2003–2016 by companies in the major European countries, we analyze the influence of supervisory capacity of the board (small size, higher proportion of outsiders and separated Chairperson-CEO positions) on acquirer returns, differentiating between Anglo-Saxon and continental European contexts. Our results confirm that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends strongly on their fit with the broader institutional context. Specifically, we find that a smaller size of the board of directors and the separation of the positions of Chairperson and CEO lead to higher acquirer returns in European Anglo-Saxon countries. By contrast, we do not find evidence that any proxy of supervisory capacity of the board significantly improves acquirer returns in the rest of countries.     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.     

深圳市线路板蚀刻废液中铜、砷、铅、汞、镉含量调查

对深圳市60家线路板企业含铜蚀刻废液中铜、砷、铅、汞、镉含量的检测结果显示:酸、碱性蚀刻废液铜含量范围分别为38.6～167.9g/L、53.7～171.8g/L,,通过测量比重推算铜含量适用于碱性废液但不适合酸性废液.56个样品可检出砷(大于3mg/L).56个样品未检出铅(小于5mg/L),其余4个铅含量偏高.所有样品汞、镉均未检出,含量分别小于4mg/L、0.3 mg/L.将各样品砷、铅、汞、镉含量实测值换算为铜含量100ga.时的相对值后发现,上述四元素在蚀刻废液中的正常值分别为＜12mgAs/L、＜5 mg Pb/L、＜4 mg Hg/L、＜0.3 mg Cd/L.     

考虑供给与需求波动性的安全库存定量研究

本文以商业企业和MTS模式下生产企业的安全库存为研究对象,将供给与需求的变动程度作为两个动态指标研究四种不同战略与运营环境下的安全库存模型,并进一步分析了降低安全库存所需的管理杠杆.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

独立董事、战略审计与公司绩效

关于独立董事与公司绩效呈现弱相关关系的一个假说性解释是:独立董事对于作为关键绩效驱动因素的公司战略管理过程参与不足。独立董事积极参与公司战略管理的功能定位是战略监督与评价,而战略审计作为正式的战略监督与评价程序,是独立董事深入公司战略管理过程以提高其绩效贡献的有效途径。本文认为,在我国推行独立董事战略审计制度,必须解决独立董事人数与比例、审计委员会设置、独立董事来源与结构以及激励与权益保护等相关问题。     

独立董事能否为收购公司股东创造财富——来自中国上市公司并购的证据

国外的实证研究结果表明，独立董事在并购中能给收购公司的股东创造财富。我们依据Harford研究方法，对我国的独立董事进行进一步的划分，并利用沪深A股285家上市公司的并购数据进行实证研究。研究结果表明：在我国设立独立董事并不能有效地为收购公司股东创造财富；但有一些证据显示，在关联方并购交易中，独立董事为收购公司股东创造了财富，尽管统计结果并不显著；在并购交易过程中，收购公司管理层的股权激励效果并不理想。     

从内部控制看我国公司董事会建设

董事会建设一直是我国公司治理的核心，该文则将董事会置于公司内部控制环境中，从控制角度探讨董事会的重要性、当前我国公司董事会存在的主要问题及其解决思路。